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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-21 U.S.C. § 881 AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT: APPLICATION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENT
TO CIVIL FORFEITURES: AUSTIN V. UNITED STATES, 113 S. CT. 2801
(1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil forfeiture has come to the forefront of law enforcement
in recent years as a forceful weapon in combating America's serious
illegal drug problem. Civil forfeiture is a procedure whereby the
government may without compensation confiscate a person's prop-
erty.' Civil forfeiture is not a new approach to law enforcement,
but has been utilized for hundreds of years. 2 However, with the
advent of a recent federal civil forfeiture statute, Title 21 U.S.C.
§ 881,1 forfeiture has become more widely used in the United States.
This statute empowers law enforcement officers to seize and retain
property which has been used to facilitate illegal drug activity or
which has been gained as a result of a drug crime.
4
In a typical civil forfeiture case, federal prosecutors may initiate
civil forfeiture proceedings simultaneously with a criminal prose-
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-07 (1993). Forfeiture
practices can be traced to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices. Exodus 21:28
has been cited as support for the historical origins of forfeiture. The verse states,
"If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely
stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten ...... Exodus 21:28 (King James); see
also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974),
reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
3. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The text of subsection
(a)(4) reads:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them: All conveyances, including aircraft,
vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport,
or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession,
or concealment of property . . . [in violation of Title 21].
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
The text of subsection (a)(6) reads:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them: All moneys, negotiable instruments,
securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished
by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this
subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this subchapter ....
21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) (1988).
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cution.1 Civil forfeiture under Section 881 has been lauded as an
important and powerful law enforcement device, since it provides
a method which may not be available in a criminal prosecution for
removing the tools and economic incentives associated with illegal
drug trade.6 For example, the government may seek forfeiture of
real or personal property which was used to facilitate a crime.
7
Money and other fruits of the crime are also subject to civil for-
feiture.8
Technically, civil forfeiture is an action in rem which is lodged
against the property and not the criminal defendant.9 For this reason,
constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants have not
historically been applied in civil forfeiture proceedings.' 0 Despite the
in rem nature of the civil forfeiture proceeding, in the past two
years the United States Supreme Court has handed down at least
five important decisions which may signal the Court's increasing
willingness to provide constitutional protections to property owners
in civil forfeiture cases." In one of those cases, Austin v. United
States, 2 the Court rejected previous lower court decisions when it
unanimously held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
5. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in
Little Rock, Ark. (Mar. 23, 1994).
6. 1992 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. ANN. REP., DEP'T OF JUST. ASSET FORFEITURE
PROGRAM 1, at 1-3.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
9. In civil forfeiture actions, the property itself, rather than the owner, is a
party to the action. See 1 DAvID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE
CASES § 2.03 (1992). Even though courts have recognized that allowing a party to
bring suit against the property is a "legal fiction" because the owner of the property
is the one who suffers loss if forfeiture occurs, courts have continually upheld this
"fiction" based primarily on legal precedent. Id.
10. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 1 U.S. 66 3, 680 (197,41
reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974) (stating that the owner's guilt is constitutionally
irrelevant in forfeiture cases).
11. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993) (holding that pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
notice and opportunity to be heard are required before the government may seize
property to be forfeited absent special circumstances); Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that the proportionality requirement applies to civil
forfeitures); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (holding
that the innocent owner defense applies to protect property owners who can show
that they were unaware of the property's involvement in a drug crime); Republic
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992) (holding that no appeal bond
is required in order to challenge forfeiture of property which has been removed
from the jurisdiction of the trial court); Richard C. Reuben, Putting the Brakes
on Forfeiture-High Court Rulings Forcing Revision on Pretrial Seizure Process,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 14.
12. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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Clause 3 applies to in rem civil forfeitures. 4 Prior to the Austin
decision, the Excessive Fines Clause had only been applied to protect
parties in criminal actions." Since a property owner is not technically
a party to an in rem civil forfeiture action, many courts and scholars
reasoned that the Excessive Fines Clause did not protect the owner
against excessive forfeitures.' 6 Following Austin, the Excessive Fines
Clause must be applied to civil forfeiture actions to protect against
penalties not proportional to the offense committed.'
7
This Note will first discuss the facts and procedural history
presented by Austin v. United States, a civil forfeiture case that
may signal a major change in forfeiture law. After the facts are
outlined, Part III reviews the general history of forfeiture and of
Title 21 U.S.C. § 881. Part III also explains the history of consti-
tutional protections afforded to persons involved in civil forfeiture
cases and the different approaches taken by courts in an effort to
justify providing constitutional protections to persons who are not
technically involved in civil in rem proceedings. Part IV addresses
the history of the Eighth Amendment specifically and how courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have applied the Eighth
Amendment to civil, forfeiture cases. Finally, Part V discusses the
significance of the Austin decision and its effect on the future of
the forfeiture law.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin met with Keith En-
gebretson at Austin's auto body shop in Minnehaha County, South
Dakota, to arrange for Engebretson to buy cocaine from Austin."8
After they both agreed to the sale, Austin traveled from the auto
13. The Excessive Fines Clause is contained in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. It provides that "[excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2812 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1977).
16. See SMrrH, supra note 9. The United States Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Fourth Circuits previously held that the Excessive Fines Clause may
apply to some civil cases. See, e.g., United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of
Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d
1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has also suggested that the Excessive Fines Clause may limit civil forfeitures,
but on different reasoning than that applied by the Third and Fourth Circuits.
See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992). This case is further discussed in note 50.
17. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
18. Id. at 2803.
1994]
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body shop to his mobile home where the cocaine was stored.' 9 He
then returned to the auto body shop and sold two grams of cocaine
to Engebretson.
20
The following day, law enforcement officers executed search
warrants at the auto body shop and the mobile home.2' The officers
found a twenty-two caliber revolver, some marijuana, and $4,700
in cash at the body shop.2 A piece of mirror, a small white tube,
and a razor were found on top of a barrel in the back of the body
shop.? From Austin's mobile home, the officers collected an elec-
tronic Ohaus scale,2 a small bag of cocaine, a bag of marijuana,
$660 in twenty dollar bills,2 and a container of cocaine marked
,1/2.26
Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota's
drug laws on August 2, 19907 and pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 2 The South Dakota
state court sentenced Austin to seven years imprisonment. 29 On
September 7, 1990, the United States initiated an in rem civil for-
feiture proceeding in the United States District Court for the District
of South Dakota, 30 seeking forfeiture of Austin's body shop and
mobile home under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).3'
Austin resisted the civil forfeiture by filing a claim and answering
the complaint.3 2 On February 4, 1991, the government moved for
summary judgment, and it supported the motion with an affidavit
from a Sioux Falls police officer which outlined the drug sale and





23. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
24. An Ohaus scale is a triple beam scale used for weighing very small objects
with great accuracy. These scales are often used by drug dealers to weigh narcotics.
25. Usually, a large number of twenty dollar bills is indicative of drug trade.
Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Nov. 22, 1993).
26. Depot St., 964 F.2d at 816. The "1/2" marking on the container of cocaine
indicates that 1/2 ounce of cocaine, a typical measurement of cocaine intended
for sale, had been previously measured and packaged for sale. Johnson Interview,
supra note 25.
27. Depot St., 964 F.2d at 816.
28. Id.
29. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. This is the normal procedure for contesting a civil forfeiture. This topic




Austin opposed the government's motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the forfeiture of his body shop and mobile home would
violate the Eighth Amendment.3 4 The district court was not persuaded
by Austin's argument and entered summary judgment for the gov-
ernment."
Austin appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 6 Although the Eighth
Circuit determined that Austin's penalty was too great in relation
to the offense committed,3 7 the court "reluctantly" agreed with the
government's position that the Eighth Amendment does not apply
to a civil forfeiture action. 8 The Eighth Circuit stated that pro-
portionality is an important concept in the common law and that
fairness would seem to require proportionality to be applied in civil
actions that result in harsh penalties. 9 However, based on its reading
of precedent on this issue, the court refused to hold that propor-
tionality would apply in this case.4
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a civil forfeiture is an action
in rem,41 and, traditionally, only persons subjected to in personam
actions have had the benefit of Eighth Amendment protections.
42
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that it is incongruous for the
Constitution to protect persons whose property is subject to an in
personam forfeiture when the same safeguards are not available to
persons facing an in rem forfeiture of their property. 43 The Eighth
Circuit stated, "Legal niceties such as in rem and in personam mean
little to individuals faced with losing important and/or valuable
assets .... 44 [W]e are troubled by the government's view that any
property, whether it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building,
can be seized by the government because the owner, regardless of





37. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
38. Id. at 817.
39. Id. The Eighth Circuit stated that the proportionality requirement of the
Eighth Amendment is "a deeply rooted concept in the common law." Id. at 817
(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983)).
40. Id. at 818.
41. Id. The in rem civil forfeiture procedure is discussed in Part III.C of this
note.
42. Id. at 817.
43. Id. at 817-18.
44. Id. at 818 (citing United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred Ninety




The Eighth Circuit stated that it was constrained to agree with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which
previously held that since the Constitution allows in rem forfeiture
to be applied against innocent owners, the Constitution must not
require forfeitures to be applied proportionally to the offense com-
mitted. 46 The Eighth Circuit declined to follow decisions by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits
on this issue which would have favored the defendant in Austin.47
Austin filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court, and the Court granted certiorar4 8 to resolve an apparent
conflict between the decision by the Eighth Circuit and a decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 49 over
the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to in rem civil forfei-
tures.5 0 The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Ex-
cessive Fines Clause does apply in civil forfeitures cases.',
46. Id. at 818.
47. Id. at 817-18; see also United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989). An "innocent owner defense"
has been consistently rejected by courts based on the idea that an in rem proceeding
is against the offending property. In an in rem action, the innocence of the owner
is irrelevant. Depot St., 964 F.2d at 817 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-87 (1974), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974)).
Unlike common law forfeiture rules, Section 881 specifically incorporates an innocent
owner defense. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(7) (Supp. V 1993). The Eighth Circuit
suggested that Congress inject "some sort of proportionality requirement ... even
though the Constitution does not mandate such a result" to aid the non-innocent
owner as well. Depot St., 964 F.2d at 818.
48. The Third and Fourth Circuits applied an analysis which was designed to
distinguish between criminal and civil proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. One
107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989). These circuits applied the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality requirement to civil cases which could be reclassified
as cr~m-nal. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of a nd, 89Q F.2d at 40t.M; Sant, 866
F.2d at 1543-44. Based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989), the Eighth
Circuit determined that such an analysis was not supiorted by case law. Depot
St., 964 F.2d at 818.
49. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
50. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992). This Second Circuit Court of Appeals case
raised issues similar to those raised in Austin. A condominium was forfeited under
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) because the owner sold cocaine on the premises. Whalers
Cove, 954 F.2d at 32. The value of the condominium was approximately three
hundred times the value of the cocaine which was sold. Id. at 37. The owner of
the property argued that the disparity between the value of the condominium and
the value of the drugs sold should be considered in the decision whether to forfeit
his condominium. Id. at 33. This forfeiture, he argued, violated the Excessive Fines




A. General History of Forfeiture
Forfeiture is the taking of a person's property, or other legal
right, without compensation.5 2 There are two general types of modern
forfeiture-civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture.5 3 Criminal forfeiture
is an in personam action brought against a criminal defendant.
5 4
Civil forfeiture, by contrast, is brought against the property itself
rather than the property owner." The property owner is not a party
to the in rem proceeding.5 6 The differences between civil and criminal
Court of Appeals applied a different line of reasoning than that adopted by the
Third and Fourth Circuits. See supra note 48. The Second Circuit reasoned that
if the sanctions imposed under-the statute were considered punitive under an analysis
announced earlier in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), then constitutional
protections which are "intrinsically personal" and serve a "humane" interest would
apply. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 35. The court found that the protections afforded
under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause were personal. Id. at 35-
37. Also, relying on Halper, the Second Circuit found that the forfeiture was
punitive, since the civil forfeiture in this case was not shown by the government
to serve an "articulated, legitimate civil purpose." Id. at 37. According to the
court, examples of an articulated, legitimate civil purpose may include eliminating
the criminal's resources and instrumentalities or providing compensation for the
government's investigation of the crime and enforcement of the law. Id. at 35-36.
The government failed to prove that any of these remedial purposes applied in
this case. Id. at 37. Since the forfeiture was punitive, the Eighth Amendment
protections attached to the forfeiture even though it was a civil proceeding. Id.
The Second Circuit found, however, that even though the Excessive Fines Clause
applied to this case, the forfeiture of the condominium was not so excessive in
relation to the crime as to violate the Constitution. Id. at 37-39.
51. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993).
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
53. See SMrrH, supra note 9, for a comparison of in rem and criminal forfeitures.
54. See SMITH, supra note 9.
55. See SMITH, supra note 9.
56. See SMITH, supra note 9. Since the civil in rem action is against the property
and not the person, personal protections afforded to criminal defendants were not
applicable in civil forfeiture cases prior to the Austin decision. See SMIH, supra
note 9. The protections afforded to criminal defendants by the United States
Constitution include: The Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure; the Fifth Amendment protections against self incrimination,
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, and double jeopardy;
the Sixth Amendment protection of a right to a speedy trial; and the Eighth
Amendment protections against excessive bail and fines and against cruel and unusual
punishment. See SmTH, supra note 9. Many of these protections are not available
to property owners in a civil forfeiture proceeding. See United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil forfeitures); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (stating that the "Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions"); United States v.
19941
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forfeiture may be more easily understood by examining the history
of this unique legal concept.
Forfeiture has been part of our law since Biblical times. 57 Under
the English common law, there were three types of forfeiture:58 the
deodand,59 forfeiture of estate,60 and statutory forfeiture. 6' Under
the rule of deodand, the value of an object which directly or indirectly
caused the death of a person was forfeited to the King. 62 Supposedly,
the King used the money to ensure that prayers were said for the
deceased, or for charitable purposes. 6  Eventually, the deodand's
religious significance ceased, and it simply became a source of revenue
to the King. 4 The King justified continued use of the deodand as
a penalty for carelessness. 65 Deodand was never accepted in the
United States. 6
The second type of early forfeiture, forfeiture of estate, was
used as punishment for felonies and treason. 67 A person convicted
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause applies to civil forfeiture proceedings but
only where the forfeiture statute makes the culpability of the owner relevant);
United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1896) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings). But see One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (holding that Fourth
Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure may be applied to for-
feitures which are not remedial in nature); Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing
in the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1160-63, 1182 (1990); Steffanie
Stracke, Comment, The Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act: Replete with Constitutional
Violations, 57 Mo. L. REv. 909, 925 (1992).
57. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974), reh'g denied, 417 U.S.
977 (1974).
58. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-83.
59. Id. at 681.
60. Id. at 682.
61. Id. at 682-83.
62. Id. at 681. This practice in forfeiture law has not been limited to English
law. Justice Holmes explained that in ancient Greece and Rome, a similar principle,
noxae dedito, was practfced. OLIVER W. HoLmms, JR., THE CommoN LAW 8-9 (1881).
According to noxae dedito, an "offending" animal, child, slave, or inanimate object
had to be surrendered to the injured victim or his or her family. Id. Eventually,
this type of forfeiture practice was replaced by the payment of the value of the
object or person over to the injured party. Id. Holmes hypothesized that our
modern system of paying monetary damages thus developed from these early
forfeiture practices. Id.
63. 1 WMLtAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *300; see also Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 681.
64. 1 WELLIAM BLACKSTONE, CommNTARIEs *300; see also Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 681.
65. Sm MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 424
(1847); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681.
66. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
67. Id.
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of such a crime forfeited all of his real and personal property to
his feudal lord or to the King." Forfeiture of estate is unconstitutional
in the United States.
6 9
The third type of forfeiture, statutory forfeiture, was used in
England to forfeit the property of persons who committed statutory
felonies and was an in rem action in the Court of Exchequer.
70
Statutory forfeiture is the only type of early forfeiture that has been
accepted by the American courts. 7' Early colonial courts exercised
in rem jurisdiction under forfeiture statutes.72 Modern criminal and
civil forfeitures are current examples of statutory forfeiture.7
3
The theory behind each type of early in rem forfeiture law was
that an object used in wrongful activity was itself guilty of the
crime.74 Accordingly, the property, rather than its owner, was the
subject of an in rem forfeiture suit. 7" While the reason for the rule
may have been long forgotten, the fiction that the offending object
may be guilty, and therefore subject to an in rem suit, has carried
forward into modern times. 76
In the United States, in rem forfeiture has been consistently
utilized by law enforcement officials to remedy problems in society.
Following the American Revolution, civil in rem forfeiture was used
to enforce protective tariffs on tea and other luxury goods, 77 on
68. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrITAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1909);
THEODORE F.T. PLUNCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 452 (1956);
see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
,69. The United States Constitution provides that "It]he Congress shall have
Power to declare Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
70. 3 WmLL4M BLACKSTONE, CO NTAmrAmS *261-62; see also Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 682.
71. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
72. Id. Some early colonists showed "disdain" for forfeitures, however, and
refused to accept them into their law. John Brew, State and Federal Forfeiture of
Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 DICK. L. REv. 461, 464 (1988).
73. 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 5(a) (1943). Forfeitures are not favored in the law.
United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pickup, 769 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1985).
They must be authorized by a given statute. 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 5(a). For an
interesting example of a forfeiture statute involving firearms, see King v. United
States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966) (regarding forfeiture of the rifle and pistol
used in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy).
74. OLrVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 6-12 (1881).
75. See SMITH, supra note 9.
76. In 1881, Justice Holmes explained that "[t]he reason which gave rise to
the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it
is to be accounted for." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881);
see also SMITH, supra note 9.
77. See Peich v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808).
19941
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tobacco imports,7 8 and to remedy piracy on the high seas. 79 Later,
forfeiture was used to curb illegal slave trade .80 During the Prohibition
era of the 1920's, civil forfeiture was used to combat "bootlegging"
in an effort to enforce the antiliquor laws."' More recently, it has
been used to ensure compliance with tax laws.82 Today, civil forfeiture
is utilized by law enforcement officials to combat problems including
illegal gambling, 3 copyright violations,8 4 sexual exploitation of
children,85 money laundering,8 6 organized crime,87 and illegal drug
trade.88
Throughout American history, however, there have been problems
associated with the use of forfeiture to handle these social concerns.
The lack of constitutional protection prior to Austin meant that the
government had few restrictions, other than those which were self
imposed,8 9 as to the amount of property that could be forfeited as
the result of a specific illegal act.90 For example, in some early cases,
entire ships were forfeited due to a crew member's violation of
78. See Lilenthals Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877).
79. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
80. See William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam (Criminal)
Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition
into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 618 (1984).
81. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
82. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1988). Forfeiture is also used extensively in other areas
including "white collar" banking and financial crime. See Robert G. Morvillo,
Forfeiture and Its Constitutional Dimensions, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1993, at 3 (col.
1).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (Supp. V 1993).
87. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
99 1961-1968, is one commonly used statute which utilizes forfeiture to remove the
profits of organized crime. RICO author es in personai" fncfpitiire aoinct persons
in violation of its requirements. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
For treatment of the relationship between the Eighth Amendment and in personam
forfeitures, see HUGHES & O'CONNELL, supra note 80 (reviewing history and modern
application of in personam forfeitures); William W. Taylor, Il1, The Problem of
Proportionality in RICO Forfeitures, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 885 (1990) (addressing
the lack of proportionality required by the statute); Vernon M. Winters, Note,
Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough" Justice Is Not
Enough, 14 HAsnlwOs CONST. L. Q. 451, 452 (1987) (suggesting that RICO should
be amended to comply more closely with the Eighth Amendment); Ian A.J. Pitz,
Note, Letting the Punishment Fit the Crime: Proportional Forfeiture Under Criminal
RICO's Source of Influence Provision, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1223 (1991).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
89. The Department of Justice carefully follows regulations for ensuring fairness
in forfeiture cases. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States
Attorney, in Little Rock, Ark. (Nov. 23, 1993).
90. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Torup, Parker 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766).
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import laws, and as recently as 1973, a leased yacht was subjected
to forfeiture because the lessee had one marijuana cigarette on board
the yacht. 91 Houses and businesses have also been forfeited because
they were used as storage or selling places for illegal drugs.92 At
least one commentator has argued that the use of forfeiture for
such valuable amounts of property, without specific statutory and
constitutional protections, may be unfair to property owners because
the value of the property forfeited bears no rational relation to the
severity of the offense committed. 91
B. History of Title 21 U.S.C. § 881
In the early 1970's, Congress revitalized its use of forfeiture in
an effort to combat increasing organized crime and illegal drug
trade. 94 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970 utilized in rem civil forfeiture as a means of curbing illegal
drug activities.95 The Act allowed the federal government to seize
cars, equipment, and other materials used to manufacture or transport
illegal drugs.9 However, it was soon clear to many that more stringent
means than the Act provided would be needed to combat the mounting
drug problem.97
In 1978, the Act was amended to include a provision aimed at
drastically reducing the profit associated with drug related crime.98
91. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665, 693 (1974),
reh'g denied, 477 U.S. 977 (1974).
92. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 815-16 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
93. Ron Champoux, Note, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws:
Does the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 247, 257
(1992).
94. The first federal laws to utilize forfeitures for controlling illegal drugs and
organized crime were RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) and
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)).
95. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)).
96. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
97. The limited success of the 1970 version of the statute has been attributed
to (1) the limited scope of property which was subject to forfeiture under the
statute, (2) the ability of persons to defeat the statute by removing, transferring,
or concealing assets prior to conviction, (3) the need to pursue almost all drug
related forfeitures via civil proceedings causing a backlog in the court since criminal
trials were also necessary to try the property owner, and (4) the untenable financial
burden placed on law enforcement agencies in an effort to pursue forfeitures. S.
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-97 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3374-80; see also Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures As
A Weapon In the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent
Ownership Rights, 72 B.U.L. REv. 217, 217 (1992).
98. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
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The addition of section 881(a)(6) allowed federal law enforcement
officers to subject the proceeds of illegal drug activity to forfeiture."
This new subsection did not allow the government to confiscate real
property, however.'°0
Significantly, Congress subsequently passed the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 which provides for forfeiture of real
and personal property which was unavailable in the earlier versions
of the statute.'0 This subsection enhances 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)
which allows federal law enforcement officers to seize any property
used in any manner to facilitate illegal drug activity. 02
C. Forfeiture Procedure under Title 21 U.S.C. § 881
There are many types of property which may be subject to
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881.103 Before property is forfeited, it
must be seized by law enforcement officials. 1°4 Until recently, this
could be accomplished with or without a warrant regardless of
whether the forfeitable property was real or personal property. 105
However, in a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (stating that the economic aspects of crime must be
attacked in order for efforts to control drug trafficking to be successful).
99. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); see supra note 4.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); see supra note 4.
101. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993)).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993). The text of the statute states that:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them: All real property, including any right,
title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any
lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
103. Forfeitable property includes: illegal controlled substances, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(1), (a)(8); equipment, raw materials, or products used to manufacture,
transport, or distribute illegal controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2), (a)(9);
containers used for storage of illegal drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3); conveyances
used to transport drugs or to facilitate a drug crime, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4); records
and research data used or intended to be used in illegal drug activity, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(5); assets which are furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or
can be traced to an illegal drug sale, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); real property used to
facilitate a drug crime, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); drug paraphernalia, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(10); and any weapons used to facilitate a drug related crime, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(11).




the government to afford notice and meaningful opportunity to be
heard before real property can be seized subject to a civil forfeiture. 106
Therefore, in civil forfeiture cases, a warrantless seizure of real
property will not be allowed under the new ruling."°
Currently, the government may seize real property without a
warrant if the seizure of the property is incidental to the arrest of
a person,31 if the property has been the subject of a prior judgment
in favor of the United States in a criminal injunction or forfeiture
proceeding,3 9 if there is probable cause to believe that the property
is a threat to public safety," 0 or if there is probable cause to believe
that the property was used to facilitate a drug crime."' Property
may also be seized by a United States Marshal after the issuance
of a warrant for the arrest of the property." 2
Following seizure of property, there are three methods for
obtaining its forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881-summary forfeiture," 3
administrative forfeiture,"' 4 and judicial forfeiture. "' Summary
forfeiture is used to forfeit controlled substances and materials used
to manufacture drugs."16 These items are considered a danger to the
public and may be forfeited without notice or a hearing."
7
Other property may be forfeited either under the administrative
forfeiture process or the judicial forfeiture process. The administrative
forfeiture procedure generally applies to property valued at $500,000
or less and conveyances used to transport or store illegal drugs,
regardless of the value of the conveyance,"' as long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the property is subject to
forfeiture." 9 In the administrative forfeiture process, the agency that
seizes the property must promptly notify' 20 any parties who appear
106. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
107. Id.
108. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (Supp. V 1993). The warrant may be executed by the
U.S. Marshal by seizing the property or affixing notice of seizure to the property.
See ARKANsAs CRmuNL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR Ass'N 19.14 (Sept. 1985).
113. 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (Supp. V 1993).
114. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1608-1610 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (Supp. V 1993).
117. See id.
118. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
119. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988).
120. 19 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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to have an interest in the property'2' that the property has been
seized and that the government intends to pursue forfeiture of the
property. 22 The notice must contain a statement of the applicable
procedures available to an individual who wants to contest the
administrative forfeiture. 23 If a person fails to respond to the
notification within a given time period, the property is automatically
deemed to be forfeited. 24 In the administrative process, the validity
of the forfeiture is determined by an official in the seizing agency,
and the agency's declaration of forfeiture is given the same force
as a judicial forfeiture order. 25
The owner of property subject to forfeiture may desire to have
a judicial forfeiture proceeding. If so, he may transfer the case from
the seizing agency to the appropriate United States Attorney's Office
by filing a claim and posting a bond for a percentage of the property's
value in the district court. 26 In cases where administrative forfeiture
is available, obtaining judicial forfeiture is at the discretion of the
property owner. 27 However, where the property subject to forfeiture
is valued at more than $500,000, the administrative process is
unavailable and judicial forfeiture is required.
12
In the judicial forfeiture procedure, a United States Attorney
files a claim against the property in federal district court pursuant
to the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims.
29
Venue is proper in the judicial district where the property owner
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
123. See id.
124. ld.; see also ARKANSAS CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR Ass'N 19.2
(Sept. 1985). The time varies depending on the property to be forfeited. ARKANSAS
CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR Ass'N 19.2 (Sept. 1985).
125. ARKANSAS CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR Ass'N 19.4 (Sept. 1985).
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
127. See ARKANSAS CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR AsS'N 19.13 (Sept.
1985).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). There are special rules for cash,
personal property, real property, and conveyances used to transport illegal drugs.
Cash and personal property may not be subjected to administrative forfeiture if
valued over $500,000. All real property must be judicially forfeited, and all con-
veyances may be forfeited via the administrative procedure regardless of value.
Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Nov. 23 1993).
129. Traditionally, admiralty procedural rules govern civil forfeitures. See Karen
L. Fisher, Note, Federal Court Jurisdiction in Civil Forfeitures of Personal Property
Pursuant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 26 IND.
L. REv. 657, 661-63 (1993).
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resides, where a criminal trial will take place if criminal charges
have been filed against the property owner, or where the property
is located. 30 The property is served with notice, and public notice
is also given to ensure that anyone with an interest in the property
is informed of the action against the property. 3'
In the judicial proceeding, once the government has shown
probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, the burden
shifts to the property owner to show that the property was not used
illegally. 32 At common law, the guilt or innocence of the owner
was constitutionally irrelevant in a forfeiture case, since the proceeding
was in rem against the property. 33 For this reason, the burden of
proof associated with criminal cases is not applicable in civil forfeiture
proceedings. 34 This means that under common law rules, an innocent
owner's property might be subject to forfeiture even though the
owner himself was not involved in the illegal activity which subjected
the property to forfeiture.'
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also David B. Smith, The
Civil Forfeiture Case's Critical Beginning, 35 THE PR~c. LAW. 57 (1989) (explaining
the forfeiture proceedings and remedies for property owners whose property has
been seized). For treatment of attorney's fees and forfeiture cases, see Claudio
Riedi, To Shift or to Shaft: Attorney Fees for Prevailing Claimants in Civil Forfeiture
Suits, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 147 (1992).
132. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The government must have probable
cause to link property with illegal drug activity but does not have to link the
property to a specific transaction. Edith A. Landman & John Hieronymus, Civil
Forfeiture of Real Property Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 70 MICH. B. J. 174, 177
(1991) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1615, and United States v. Banco
Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir. 1986)).
133. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
134. Forfeiture proceedings are not subject to the same burden of proof, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that is required in criminal proceedings. Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804-05 (1993) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
135. This rule has provoked criticism by some commentators. For treatment of
issues related to the innocent owner concern, see Brad A. Chapman, The Drug
War and Real Estate Forfeiture Under 2f U.S.C. § 881: The "Innocent" Lienholder's
Rights, 21 TEx. TECH L. Rv. 2127 (1990) (discussing the effect of the "relation-
back" doctrine on forfeiture procedure affecting the rights of innocent land owners);
Anne-Marie Feeley, Comment, Forfeiture of Marital Property Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7): Irreconcilable Differences?, 37 VLL. L. REV. 1487 (1992) (discussing
the effect of forfeiture of marital property on an innocent spouse); Mark A.
Jankowski, Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Ap-
proach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REv. 165 (1990) (discussing
the "relation-back" doctrine which imparts ownership of property used in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 881 as of the date of the offense. The "relation-back" doctrine
has allowed forfeiture of property in the hands of an innocent transferee based
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Both state and federal courts have justified taking property from
"innocent" owners by repeating the legal fiction that the offense
attaches to the offending object rather than the person. 36 For example,
in Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 37 the Supreme Court held
that the owner of real property and the distillery situated thereon
did not have recourse against a forfeiture suit incurred by the illegal
conduct of his lessee who was operating the distillery.'3 The Court
stated that the offense attached to the distillery. 39 The personal
misconduct or responsibility of the owner was irrelevant beyond the
responsibility arising from the fact that he leased the property to
the distiller who used the property wrongly.40 As in Dobbin's, other
decisions seem to rely on this underlying rationale that the owner
was negligent by entrusting the property to the person committing
the illegal act.' 4' The Supreme Court has, however, reserved judgment
as to whether a "totally innocent" owner's property would be subject
to forfeiture and has indicated that this issue would raise "serious
constitutional questions."' 
42
To remedy this concern, when drafting Section 881, Congress
specifically provided a defense for an innocent property owner.
43
Section 881(a)(7) disallows forfeiture of property from an owner
whose property was used illegally without his or her knowledge or
on the notion that the transferee did not have ownership rights in the property if
it was transferred after the commission of a crime, since the government owned
the property as of the date of the crime); Eugene J. Morris & Steven L. Kessler,
Real Property Forfeiture: Seizure of Property Emerges as Law Enforcement Device,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13, 1993, at 35 (col. 2) (discussing the marketability of titles of
real property subjected to forfeiture and the due diligence requirements of lawyers
executing title searches involving property which may have been involved in a
forfeiture proceeding). Today, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) provides a defense for innocent
property holders. The statute states that "no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
136. See, e.g., Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
137. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
138. Id. at 402-04.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 401.
141. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-10 (1993).
142. Id. at 2809; see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (stating
in dictum that if a property owner is "totally powerless" to prevent crime, then
he is totally innocent and civil forfeiture might not be allowed); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-89 (1974), reh'g denied, 477 U.S.
977 (1974).
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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consent. 1" Congress did not, however, specify which constitutional
protections should be provided to owners who are not innocent, nor
did it require that the amount forfeited be in proportion to the
severity of the crime committed. 45 In interpreting statutes like Section
881, courts have supplied constitutional protections which are not
specifically provided in the text of the statute but which may be
warranted by reason and fairness. 46
If the court determines that the property is to be forfeited,
ownership of the property is transferred to the United States and
the property is taken into the custody of the United States Attorney
General. 47 Some contraband must be destroyed,' 48 but the Attorney
General has discretion as to what may be done with most of the
seized property. 49 Forfeited property may be sold and the proceeds
used to pay for the costs incurred in fighting crime. 50 The Attorney
General may also retain the property for official use or transfer the
property to any federal, state, or foreign law enforcement agency
which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property.' 5
The statute provides that seized cash must be used to pay expenses
of the proceedings for forfeiture and sale, including the costs associated
with seizure, maintenance of custody, advertising, and court costs. 52
Any money remaining after all costs have been paid must be forwarded
to the United States Treasurer to be deposited in the treasury's
144. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
145. Id.
146. This has required careful interpretation of the specific wording of the statute.
See Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture
Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471,
475-78 (1989) (discussing the meaning of "facilitation" under § 881(a)(7)).
147. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(4)(B)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Illegal narcotics and dangerous,
toxic, or hazardous materials are examples of contraband goods. Id. § 881(f)(1).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(A) (1988). Proceeds may also go toward paying costs
of maintaining custody of forfeited goods or to pay monetary rewards of up to
$100,000 to persons who provide original information which leads to the arrest
and conviction of a person who kills or kidnaps a federal drug law enforcement
agent. Id.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A), (E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These sections apply
to property that is used for law enforcement purposes including office furniture
or cars which may be necessary for undercover drug operations. The three objectives
of the Federal Asset Forfeiture Program are "(1) law enforcement, (2) enhanced
law enforcement cooperation through equitable sharing of forfeiture proceeds, and
(3) as a by-product, revenue to enhance forfeitures and strengthen law enforcement."
1992 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. ANN. REP., DEP'T OF JUST. ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM
1, at 7.
152. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(A), (B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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general fund.' Federal and state law enforcement agencies share in
the forfeited profits.'5 4 Thus, state and local agencies are rewarded
for cooperating with federal law enforcement efforts.'55
As a final safeguard, following forfeiture, anyone with an interest
in forfeited property has an opportunity to petition for remission
or mitigation of the forfeiture. 5 6 The petition is heard by a
representative of the seizing agency if the property was forfeited
under the administrative procedure or by a representative of the
Department of Justice if the property was forfeited under the judicial
procedure.' 57 In determining whether remission or mitigation is
available to a property owner, the appropriate official will consider
a series of factors including the validity of the interest of the person
requesting remission or mitigation, whether that person had knowledge
of or was involved in the wrongful act, and whether that person
took reasonable steps to prevent the wrongful act from occurring. 58
153. Id.
154. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in
Little Rock, Ark. (Nov. 23, 1993).
155. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) sets forth the method of
distribution. In distributing property to law enforcement officials, the Attorney
General must ensure that the property transferred to a state or local agency has
a value that is reasonably related to the degree of direct participation that the
state or local agency exercised in the law enforcement effort which resulted in the
forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3). The Attorney General should take into account
the total value of all property forfeited and the total law enforcement effort with
respect to the violation of law on which the forfeiture is based. Id. Furthermore,
the Attorney General should consider what will serve to encourage further coop-
eration between the recipient state or local agency and federal law enforcement
agencies. Id.
156. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The statute requires that:
Whenever any person [who] ... has incurred, or is alleged to have incurred,
any fine or penalty [under this chapter] files . . . before the sale [of the
propertyl a petition for the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty,
or forfeiturc, the Iappropriate official] if he finds that such fine, penalty,
or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any in-
tention on the parf of the petition to defraud the revenue or to violate
the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to
justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
may remit or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he
deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any prosecution
relating thereto.
Id.
157. THE ARKANSAS CRiMNAL LAW HANDBOOK, ARK. BAR Ass'N 19.14 (Sept.
1985). Some commentators have suggested that the process which allows return of
property to innocent owners may not be sufficient protection of the owners' interests,
since it may take several months following the forfeiture proceeding to return the
property to the owner. Id. at 19.3-.4. In its amicus curiae brief to the United
States Supreme Court, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argued
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These protections are set forth by regulation but are not specifically
required by the United States Constitution.'5 9
D. General History of Constitutional Protections in Civil
Forfeiture
The lack of procedural safeguards associated with forfeiture
laws has been the subject of controversy surrounding the use of
civil forfeiture.' 60 Property owners have argued that even though the
proceeding is in rem against their property and they are technically
not a party to the action, the forfeiture action deprives them of
their property in violation of rights provided by the Constitution.'
6'
In response to the property owners' arguments, the United States
Supreme Court has held that despite the in rem nature of civil
forfeitures, owners of forfeited property are to be provided with
some constitutional protections. 62 Courts have recognized that harsh
consequences may result from a strict application of the distinction
between in rem and in personam forfeitures.' 63 However, in order
to justify the apparent logical problem of applying personal
constitutional protections to aid an individual who is theoretically
uninvolved in an in rem action, the courts have had to develop
different rationales for allowing constitutional provisions to protect
property owners in forfeiture actions. The United States Supreme
Court has applied three basic rationales in an effort to solve this
problem.
that "[rielief is so rarely granted to anyone except banks and wholly innocent lien
holders that knowledgeable attorneys consider it a waste of time to seek remission
or mitigation of forfeiture penalty." Austin Loss Might Undermine Forfeiture
Program, Prentice Hall Law and Business, Criminal Division (1993); see Christopher
M. Neronha, Note, In re Metmor Financial, Inc.: The Better Approach to Post-
Seizure Interest Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
65 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 853 (1990) (discussing the award of post-seizure interest
to innocent parties); Congress Hears Charges of Forfeiture Abuse, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
12, 1992, at 5.
158. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(b) (1993).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Steven L. Kessler, Tide is Turning in Federal Forfeiture Rulings,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1993, at 1 (col. 1); see also Henry C. Darmstadter & Leslie J.
Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeitures
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WMnTrR L. REv. 27, 29 (1987).
161. This was Austin's argument in Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2804 (1993).
162. See supra note 56.
163. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). In Alexander,
the Court held that in personam criminal forfeiture under RICO was no different
than a fine, and so the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause would apply
to disallow disproportionate forfeitures. Id. at 2775-76. Alexander was decided on
the same day that the Court handed down the Austin decision. Id. at 2766.
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1. The Quasi-Criminal Approach
In some instances, the Court has classified civil forfeiture as
"quasi-criminal in nature."' 64 The idea is that if the effect of the
proceeding is like that of criminal proceedings, constitutional rights
must be protected. 165 In 1886, in Boyd v. United States,'" the Supreme
Court held that civil forfeitures are subject t6 Fourth Amendment
protections against unlawful search and seizure. 67 In that case, the
owner and importer of thirty-five cases of plate glass fraudulently
attempted to avoid import duties imposed by the federal government
by falsifying records regarding the glass.'" The governing statute in
force at the time required the owner to forfeit the records to the
government or a confession of wrongdoing would be assumed.1
9
The Court stated that even though the forfeiture proceeding was
civil in form, it was criminal in nature because the suit was instituted
as a result of the commission of a criminal offense. 70 The Court
held that the forfeiture requirement was quasi-criminal, and, thus,
it was subject to the Unreasonable Search and Seizure Clause of
the Fourth Amendment. 7' Accordingly, the Court refused to admit
evidence which was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
in order to sustain the forfeiture. 72 The Court also found that the
Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable
since the defendant faced further criminal sanctions.
73
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to civil forfeiture again in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania.7 4 In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, the owner of an
automobile was stopped by state law enforcement officers. 75 In the
164. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
165. Id.
166. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
167. Id. at 635.
168. Id. at 617.
169. Id. at 617-20. The relevant portion of the statute, "An Act to Amend the
Customs Revenue Laws and to Repeal Moieties," reads:
The attorney representing the government, whenever in his belief any
business book, invoice, or paper belonging to or under the control of the
defendant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the
United States, [may] issue notice to the defendant ... to produce such
book ... and if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce
such book ... the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken
as confessed ....
Id.




174. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
175. Id. at 694.
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trunk of the car, the officers found thirty-one cases of liquor176
which did not have the required Pennsylvania tax seals attached.'7
The driver was arrested and the car was seized. 78 Following the
arrest, the State of Pennsylvania filed for forfeiture of the car. 79
The State attempted to admit evidence into the forfeiture proceeding
regarding a search of the car which did not comply with Fourth
Amendment requirements.'"* Following the ruling in Boyd, the Court
refused to admit such evidence.'' According to the Court, the object
of forfeiture in civil proceedings, as in criminal proceedings, is to
penalize an individual for the commission of an offense against the
law. 82 The Court agreed with the Boyd Court that the quasi-criminal
nature of the forfeiture proceeding mandated this conclusion, and,
thus, the forfeiture of the automobile could not stand.8 3 The Court
stated that if the car had been contraband per se as was the liquor,
then it may have been forfeited anyway.'8
2. The Reclassification Approach
Expounding on the quasi-criminal justification, the Court has
also rationalized application of constitutional protections to forfeited
property owners by holding that a civil statute may be reclassified
by courts as being criminal where the purpose or effect of the statute
is extremely punitive. 85 In United States v. Ward,8 6 the Court set
forth a two-prong test which was to be used to determine when a
civil statute became so punitive as to become criminal. 8 7 The test
required a court to first determine whether Congress indicated, either
expressly or impliedly, a preference for one label or the other when
it established the penalizing mechanism.' 8 Second, when Congress





180. Id. at 694-95.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 699-700.
183. Id. at 699.
184. Id. Summary forfeiture is applied to contraband goods. 21 U.S.C. § 881(f)
(Supp. V 1993).
185. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive
Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.
J. 1795 (1992) (discussing the rationale, *approaches, and trends in application of
punitive civil sanctions by courts).
186. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
187. Id. at 248-49.
188. Id. at 248.
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has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, the court may
inquire whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate that intention. 8 9 In order to determine whether
the statute in question in Ward was so punitive as to be considered
criminal under the second part of the Ward analysis, the Court
relied on a test set out earlier in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez'9°
which required the Court to weigh several factors, including the
culpability of the individual involved as well as the history and
purpose of the law.' 9' Utilizing the two tests in concert, the Ward
Court found that the statute in question was basically remedial in
nature and did not require the constitutional protections which would
be afforded had it been determined to be more punitive in nature. 92
3. The Punishment Approach
In 1989, the Supreme Court carried the Ward analysis a step
further. Rather than requiring a criminal or quasi-criminal
classification, in United States v. Halper'93 the Court determined
that the distinctions between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings
ceased to be important where the civil proceeding inflicted punishment
on the offender.'9 In Halper, the Court sought to determine when
a civil penalty constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy
analysis under the Fifth Amendment.'95 A man was convicted of
sixty-five counts of Medicaid fraud which caused a $585 loss to the
federal government. I9 He was sentenced to two years in prison and
was assessed a $5,000 fine.'9 Following his conviction, the United
189. Id. at 248-49.
190. 372 U.S 144 (1963). The test set forth in Kennedy required a court to
consider the following factors when determining whether a civil sanction was so
punitive as to warrant reclassification as a criminal sanction:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, [3] whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (41 whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6]
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned ....
Id. at 168-69.
191. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
192. Id. at 254.
193. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
194. Id. at 447-48 (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment).
195. Id. at 448.




States brought a civil action against him under the False Claims
Act' 9 which had a provision requiring an offender to pay a $2,000
civil penalty, an amount equal to two times the amount of damages
sustained as a result of the illegal act and costs of the civil action. 199
Considering court costs, double damages, and other expenses, the
total amount of liability was over $130,000.20
Halper argued that the trial court's imposition of the civil fine
following a criminal penalty violated the Fifth Amendment. 20 1 The
Court agreed. 202 The Court noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 20 3 In
defining what is meant by "punishment," the Court stated that the
civil and criminal labels are not important. 2° Punishment, the Court
said, may be imposed by either civil or criminal actions. 205 Both
criminal and civil proceedings may have punitive as well as remedial
goals. 2°6 Where the purpose of a civil sanction is retribution or
deterrence, the sanction constitutes punishment.2 In Halper, the
Court made it clear that its focus was not on the criminal or civil
nature of the proceeding but on whether punishment was being
inflicted on the offender. 201 This reasoning was extended in Austin
to provide Eighth Amendment protections to persons whose property
is the subject of in rem civil proceedings. 209
E. History of Eighth Amendment Protections in Civil Forfeiture
There are two clauses in the Eighth Amendment: the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause. 210 In
Ingraham v. Wright,2" a 1977 case, the United States Supreme Court
examined the history of the Eighth Amendment and found that since
the goal of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was to limit
198. Id.. The False Claims Act is found at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988).
199. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-40.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 451.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
204. Id. at 447-48.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 448.
208. Id. at 451.
209. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
210. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend VIII.
211. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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the power of courts only in criminal cases, the Cruel and Unusual




A few years later, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc. ,213 the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to civil cases. In Browning-
Ferris, Kelco brought suit in federal district court against Browning-
Ferris Industries (BFI) for antitrust violations and for tortious
interference with contract. 2 4 The jury found BFI liable and awarded
$51,000 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive
damages. 215 BFI argued that the Excessive Fines Clause should be
applied to limit the "excessive" punitive damage award. 216 The Court
rejected BFI's contention based on the reasoning that the Eighth
Amendment applies "primarily, and perhaps exclusively," to criminal
prosecutions and punishments.
21 7
The Court reviewed the history of the Excessive Fines Clause
and determined that when the clause was drafted the term "fines"
was understood as payment to the government for an offense.
218
The aim of the Eighth Amendment, the Court said, was to limit
potential governmental abuses of its prosecutorial power. 2 9 The
purpose of the drafters was not to limit the extent of civil damages.2
0
The Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause would not limit the
punitive damages awarded to a private party in a civil suit where
the government neither prosecuted the action nor had any right to
receive a share of the damages. 1 Importantly, however, the Court
declined to "go so far as to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause
212. Id. at 659, 664-65. Ingraham was not a forfeiture case. In Ingraham, the
Court was asked to determine whether severe corporal punishment in public schools
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Id. at 659. The Court reviewed the history of the Eighth Amendment and stated
that "Itihe text [of the Eighth Amendment] was taken, almost verbatim, from a
provision of the V;irginia Declarton ,f Rights of 1776, which in turn derived
from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.... [Tlhe exclusive concern of the English
version was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law." Id. at 664-65.
Early Americans, fearing "the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments
not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by legislatures"
in the United States, included the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Id. at
665.
213. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
214. Id. at 261.
215. Id. at 262.
216. Id. at 260-62.
217. Id. at 262.
218. Id. at 265; see also supra note 210.
219. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 260.
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applies just to criminal cases.' '222 Since the Court did not address
whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil cases involving
government actors, lower courts have been required to make this
determination without guidance from the Supreme Court. As a result,
lower federal court decisions are widely varied?3
IV. REASONING OF TE COURT
A. Overview
The Court granted certiorari to Austin2 to solve a conflict
between the circuits regarding whether the Eighth Amendment




The government advanced three main arguments against the application
of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeitures. First, the government
argued that in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
the Court established that the Excessive Fines Clause should not
apply to any civil suits."7 The Court rejected this argument by
pointing out that the rule set forth in Browning-Ferris was limited
to cases involving only private litigants.2 Because in Austin the
government was a party to the action, Browning-Ferris did not bar
application of the Excessive Fines Clause. 229 Second, the government
argued that the Eighth Amendment could not apply in a forfeiture
case unless the forfeiture proceeding would have been considered a
criminal action when the Eighth Amendment was adopted.230 The
222. Id. at 263.
223. Id.
224. United States v. Austin, 113 S. Ct. 1036 (1993). In Austin v. United States,
the majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun. Justices White, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter joined in the majority opinion. Austin v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 2801, 2802-12 (1993). Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at
2812-15 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. Id. at 2815-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804. Most circuit courts have held that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to civil forfeitures. Katherine Abernathy, Eighth Amend-
ment Survey, 19 AM. J. CRwA. L. 341, 342 (1992) (citing United States v. One
107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, 898 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.
1990); United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 52 (1991); United States v. 40 Moon Hill
Rd., 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)). But see United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,
954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
226. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
227. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.




Court rejected this argument based on its conclusion that the criminal
or civil label placed on an action is irrelevant to the application of
the Eighth Amendment. 231 Instead, the Court determined that the
relevant question is whether the government action is so punitive
that it would be considered punishment under the Eighth Amendment
both when the Eighth Amendment was adopted and according to
modern standards. 232 Finally, the government argued that even under
the modern analysis adopted by the Court, since Section 881 forfeiture
is designed to protect the public from illegal drug trade, it is remedial
in nature rather than punitive. Therefore, the Excessive Fines Clause
is not applicable to civil forfeitures. 231 The Court rejected the argument
that all forfeitures are remedial and concluded that the Excessive
Fines Clause is applicable to civil forfeitures under Section 881 .234
B. Browning-Ferris Does Not Bar Applicability of Excessive
Fines Clause
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that its earlier
decision in Browning-Feris did not bar applicability of the Excessive
Fines Clause in this case. 2"1 The Court stated that in Browning-
Ferris it only held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not limit
the award of punitive damages to a private party in a civil suit
where the government was not a prosecuting party.23 6 Since the
government was the prosecuting party in Austin, the Browning-Ferris
rule would not bar application of the Excessive Fines Clause in the
Austin case. 237 The Court specifically noted that Browning-Ferris did
not hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to criminal
cases 238
C. No Historical Limitations on Excessive Fines Clause
Applicability
The government's second argument. was that the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause should not apply unless the
government's action would have been recognized as criminal
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2805, 2810.
233. Id. at 2811.
234. Id. at 2811-12.
235. Id. at 2804 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S
257, 264 (1989)).
236. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993).
237. Id. at 2804 (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263).
238. Id. at 2804.
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punishment at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted. 239
Addressing this argument, the Court made two observations. First,
the Court studied the text of the Eighth Amendment itself.240 The
Court pointed out that some provisions of the Bill of Rights are
specifically limited to criminal cases3 4 1 For example, the Fifth
Amendment says that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,"24 2 and the Sixth
Amendment states that it applies to "criminal prosecutions." 243
Significantly, the Eighth Amendment contains no textual limitation
which restricts it to criminal cases. 2 "
The Court then proceeded to examine the history of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.2 5 The Court determined that
the history of the Excessive Fines Clause does not require it to be




242. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
243. Id. at 2804-05 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI). The Court acknowledged
that when it has applied constitutional protections to civil forfeiture proceedings
in the past, it has recognized a distinction between those provisions which are
limited to criminal proceedings and those which are not. Id. at 2804. The Court
cited One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) and
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886), as examples of the Court's
application of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure
in forfeiture proceedings. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804 n.4. The Court pointed out
that the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accuser has not been applied
to forfeiture cases. Id. at 2804.05 n.4 (citing United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S.
475, 480-82 (1896)). However, the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause may
protect property owners in forfeiture proceedings if a subsequent sanction is not
remedial in nature. Id. at 2805 n.4 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
446-49 (1989)); see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 364 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972). Also, the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination has been applied
to forfeiture proceedings even though this clause is textually limited to criminal
cases. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4. However, the Self Incrimination Clause has
only been applied to civil forfeitures where the forfeiture statute made the culpability
of the owner relevant or where the owner faced possible subsequent criminal
proceedings. Id. at 2805 n.4 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-54
(1980)); see also United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,
721-22 (1971); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). Additionally, the
Court recognized that under the rule set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963), if a civil proceeding is so punitive as to be reasonably
considered criminal, protections traditionally afforded in criminal proceedings have
been provided. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4.
244. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05.
245. Id. at 2805-06.
246. Id. at 2808-09. The Court noted that had the government attempted to
argue that the technical distinction between in rem and in personam mattered in
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drafted immediately following the drafting of the Fifth Amendment, u7
the Court reasoned that if the drafters intended to limit the application
of the Excessive Fines Clause to criminal cases, they would have
done so just as they limited the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. us As
a historical note, the Court pointed out that the comparable provision
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was not limited expressly to
criminal cases either u9 The Court recognized that the original draft
of the English Bill of Rights contained a restrictive provision regarding
the Excessive Bail Clause, but the provision was omitted in the final
draft. 250 The purpose of the Eighth Amendment, the Court concluded,
was to limit the government's power to punish regardless of the
label placed on the proceeding. 25Y
D. Ward and Mendoza Tests Are Not Applicable
The government's third argument in Austin was that the Eighth
Amendment could not apply to the civil forfeiture because the
forfeiture was not so punitive as to be considered criminal under
the Ward and Mendoza tests. 2 2 The Court rejected this reasoning. 253
this case, it would not have benefited the government. The Court stated that this
distinction is primarily a jurisdictional issue which is unimportant when determining
whether punishment is intended or imposed. Id. at 2808-09 n.9.
247. Id. at 2805 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 259, 294 (1989)).
248. Id. at 2805 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 294 (1989)). The Court stated in Browning-Ferris that "[a]fter deciding to
confine the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to the Eighth Amendment.
There were no proposals to limit that Amendment to criminal proceedings." Id.
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 294 (1989)).
249. Id. at 2805.
250. Id. The Austin Court stated that when Section 10 of the English Bill of
Rigts of 6IQ9 as Jntn*o ,,.A in the H^ c of Commons, there Was a restriction
in the bail clause which read, "[R]equiring excessive Bail of Persons committed
in criminal Cases, and imposing excessive Fines, and illegal Punishments [shall) be
prevented." Id.
251. Id. (discussing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 266-67, 275 (1989)).
252. Id. at 2804.
253. Id. at 2804-06. This decision may have surprised some. Prior to Austin,
many authors hypothesized that when the Court decided to apply the proportionality
requirements of the Eighth Amendment to forfeitures, the Court would or should
simply allow the lower courts to apply the Ward and Mendoza tests as they have
done in relation to the Fifth Amendment. This would have allowed the lower courts
to require proportionality if the punishment was so severe as to require the civil
forfeiture to be reclassified as criminal. See Henry C. Darmstadter & Leslie J.
Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeitures
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WMrrrrR L. Rv. 27, 49-53 (1987); James B. Speta,
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The Court stated that the relevant question was not whether forfeiture
under Section 881 is civil or criminal but rather whether it was
punishment. 254 Since the appropriate question is whether punishment
is being inflicted and not whether the sanctions are criminal or civil,
the Court reasoned that the tests set forth in Ward and Mendoza
were not applicable to this particular case.
2"
E. Forfeiture is Punishment
Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether the forfeiture
serves as punishment. 2 6 The Court reasoned that a fine may be
both remedial in part and penal in part. 257 Even if the forfeiture
serves some remedial purposes, if it serves at least in part to punish,
the Eighth Amendment will apply. 258 In its analysis, the Court sought
to determine whether forfeiture was regarded as punishment, at least
in part, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified and whether
civil forfeitures under Section 881 should be considered as punishment
today.
259
1. History of Forfeiture
In determining whether forfeiture was viewed as punishment at
the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the Court reviewed
the history of the three types of forfeiture: deodand, forfeiture of
estate, and statutory forfeiture3.6 The Court pointed out that the
deodand was justified on the basis that the owner had been negligent
in entrusting his property to a wrongdoer. 261 Forfeiture of estate,
the Court reasoned, was based on the premise that since property
is a right which is derived from society, it may be lost when a
Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial
Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. Rv. 165, 182-91 (1990);
Ron Champoux, Note, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal Drug Laws: Does
the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTiNGS CONST. L. Q. 453, 457-58
(1992) (examining the potential for excessive punishments under 21 U.S.C. § 881).
But see David J. Stone, Note, The Opportunity of Austin v. United States: Toward
a Functional Approach to Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment, 73 B.U.
L. REv. 427, 435 (1993).
254. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
255. Id. at 2806 n.6.




260. Id. The history of the three types of forfeiture is discussed in Part II1.A
of this note.
261. Id. The Court quoted William Blackstone who wrote, "[S]uch misfortunes
are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly
punished by such forfeiture." 2 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301.
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person violates a law of that society. 262 Finally, the Court stated
that Blackstone considered statutory forfeiture to be penal. 263 As
with deodand, statutory forfeiture was justified on the basis that
the owner was somehow negligent in entrusting his property to one
who would eventually commit a wrong." The Court concluded that
all three early types of forfeiture served in part to punish the
negligence or intentional wrongdoing of the owner.23
Next, the Court specifically focused on early American thought
regarding the purpose of statutory forfeiture, 266 since statutory
forfeiture was the only type of forfeiture adopted in the United
States. 267 The Court found that the colonies understood the purpose
of in rem forfeiture as being, at least in part, to punish. 26 The
Court pointed out that some early American statutes specifically
required owners to forfeit property as a penalty for statutory
violations .269
2. The Innocent Owner Problem
The Court then addressed the perplexing question-if the Court
has always allowed forfeiture to be used against innocent owners,
then how can it be considered punishment for wrongdoing? 270 The
Court recognized that in past decisions the in rem fiction apparently
allowed forfeiture from innocent owners.2 7' The Court pointed out,
however, that in those decisions, the Court had justified imposing
262. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807 (discussing 2 WLLiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*299).
263. Id. at 2807.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2806-07.
266. Id. at 2807.
267. Id.
268. d
269. Id. at 2807-08 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 39). The statute
cited by the Austin Court stated that property forfeiture was a penalty for violation
of a law requiring goods to be unloaded from ships only during the day and with
a permit. Id. The statute required that for a violation, the ship owrer "shall forfeit
and pay the sum of four hundred dollars for every offence ... [a]nd all goods,
wares and merchandise . . . shall become forfeited." Id. at 2807-08. These statutes
are especially notable, the Court said, because forfeiture was listed among other
punishments and because the word "forfeit" was used for fine. Id. The Court
also pointed out that dictionaries which were in use at the time also said that
"fine" and "forfeiture" were interchangeable. Id. at 2808 n.7.
270. Id. at 2808.
271. Id. at 2808-09. The Court summarized that "even though this Court has
rejected the 'innocence' of the owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture, it
consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the
owner." Id. at 2810.
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forfeiture of the property of innocent owners by stating that the
owner was not in fact entirely innocent. 272 The Court said that its
decisions have allowed forfeiture from innocent owners based on
two theories. First, forfeiture from innocent owners is appropriate
when the property itself is "guilty"; also, the owner may be held
responsible "for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts the
property.1 273 Both theories are based, the Court said, on the "notion
that the owner who allows his property to become involved in an
offense has been negligent. 27 4 The Court noted that in past decisions,
it expressly reserved ruling on the question of whether the in rem
fiction could be employed against a truly innocent owner. Since the
defendant in Austin was not innocent, the Court again reserved its
opinion as to that issue. 275 The Court indicated, however, that the
Constitution might not allow forfeiture to be used to demand property
from a truly innocent owner.
27 6
3. Modern Thought on Civil Forfeiture
The Court went on to address whether civil forfeitures under
Section 881 are considered as punishment today. 277 The Court said
that Congress intended the forfeiture provision as at least partial
punishment since the drafters incorporated a defense for innocent
owners into the statute. 278 According to the Court, if Congress's aim
272. Id. at 2808-10.
273. Id. at 2808.
274. Id. at 2809 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 683 (1974), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395
(1877); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)). The Court also cited Peisch v. Ware, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808). In Peisch, the owner failed to pay revenue duties as
required by federal law. Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 359 (1808). Despite
his nonpayment, the owner attempted to remove goods from the custody of the
revenue officer. Id. The Court held that the ship could not be forfeited unless the
owner or agent had consented to the illegal removal. Id. at 363-64. The Court in
Peisch stated that "the law is not understood to forfeit the property of owners
or consignees, on account of the misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such
owners or consignees could have no control." Id. at 365; see also Austin, 113
S. Ct. at 2808.
275. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809.
276. Id. The Court added that "it is only on the assumption that forfeiture
serves in part to punish that the Court's past reservation of that question makes
sense." Id.
277. Id. at 2810.
278. Id. at 2810-11.
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had not been so, there would be no reason for the innocent owner
defense.279 The Court noted that when drafting a related statute
requiring the return of forfeited property to persons who did not
intend to commit a criminal act, Congress's purpose was "to impose
a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise.' ' Likewise, the Court found that the legislative history
of Section 881 reveals that the purpose of Section 881 was to deter
crime and to punish the wrongdoer. 281
The Court rejected the government's final contention that the
statute is remedial in nature rather than punitive.n2 The government
based this argument on two considerations. First, the government
argued that since the forfeiture removes the instruments of the drug
trade, it protects the community from future violations of the anti-
drug laws.u 3 In response, the Court drew upon its analysis in One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennslyvania.2" The Court stated that like
the automobile in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,n5 the mobile home
and body shop in this case are not a threat to society per se and
cannot fairly be said to be contraband.2 Since houses and body
shops are not contraband or an "instrument of the crime necessarily,"
the Court stated that there is no need to remove them from society.
Therefore, the forfeiture of this property was not remedial.2
7
Second, the government argued that the forfeiture provision was
remedial because it compensates the government for costs incurred
in fighting the illegal drug activity and other problems that illegal
narcotics cause in society.2 8 The Court also rejected this argument
by noting that there have been large differences between the cost
of law enforcement and the amount sought to be recovered through
279. Id. at 2811. This defense allows the return of forfeited property not intended
by the owner to be used to violate the law.
280. id. at 2811 (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715 (1971)).
281. Id. at 2811. The Court noted that Congress said, "IT]he traditional criminal
sanction of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously
profitable trade in dangerous drugs." Id. (qutoing S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182). Congress also stated
that the law was intended to be "a powerful deterrent." Id. at 2811 (citing S.
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182).
282. Id. at 2811.
283. Id.
284. Id. (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699
(1956)).
285. Id. at 2811.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2812 n.14.
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forfeiture in individual cases. 28 9 The Court reasoned that even if
compensation was a partial goal, one aim of the statute was still
to punish. 290 Since at least one goal of Congress in enacting forfeiture
statutes was punitive both when the Eighth Amendment was enacted
and today, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment is applicable
to in rem civil forfeitures. 29' Moreover, the Court pointed out that
it does not matter whether the courts apply the Excessive Fines
Clause to a remedial fine because it will, by definition, never be
"excessive.'"292
The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals to determine whether the forfeiture of Austin's mobile home
and auto body shop violated the Excessive Fines Clause. 293 The Court
refused to establish a multifactor test for determining whether a
forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth Amendment, thus leaving it
for the lower courts to decide what "excessive" will mean.
294
E. Concurring Opinions
Justice Scalia concurred, stating that the Court could have relied
on its reasoning in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc. to decide this case. 295 Justice Scalia added that the majority
was overstating precedent when it said that the in rem fiction was
actually based on a negligence theory. 296 Most importantly, Justice
Scalia proposed a test which might be used by the lower courts in
determining whether a forfeiture is excessive and thus in violation
of the Excessive Fines Clause.297
Justice Scalia's concurrence suggested that the proportionality
analysis in civil forfeiture cases should be different from those tests
289. Id.
290. Id. at 2812. The Austin Court discussed its earlier analysis in United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989), where it stated that "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment,
as we have come to understand the term." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.




295. Id. at 2812-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Browning-Ferris, the Court stated
that when the Eighth Amendment was drafted, "fine" was understood to mean
punishment. Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257 (1989)).
296. Id. at 2814. Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia would have reserved the
question of whether personal culpability is required without engaging in the "mis-
leading discussion" regarding negligence.
297. Id. at 2814-15.
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
which are currently being utilized in regard to criminal fines and
in personam forfeiture cases. 29 In in personam forfeiture cases the
goal of the Eighth Amendment is to prevent potential government
abuses of power against the person. 2" Therefore, the Excessive Fines
Clause requires that the monetary fine be in relation to the offense
committed by the defendant. 3°° In an in rem proceeding, however,
the offense committed by the offender is often not relevant in the
forfeiture proceeding, and conviction is not a prerequisite to
forfeiture. 30 1 Section 881 only requires the government to show
probable cause that the property was used illegally.302 For these
reasons, the test for an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding must be
different from proceedings involving monetary fines or in personam
forfeiture.
30 3
Justice Scalia suggested that a civil forfeiture violates the Excessive
Fines Clause if the property forfeited cannot "properly be regarded
as an instrumentality of the offense. ' '3 04 The inquiry should not
involve the value of the forfeited property, but should question
whether it "has a close enough relation to the offense . . . to render
the property, under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence
forfeitable.
' 305
A second concurring opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy.30
He wrote that the question of whether in rem forfeitures always
amount to an intended punishment of the owner of the forfeited
property should be reserved. 3°7 He wrote that the question should
be reserved because of the effect it may have on a future decision
regarding whether in rem forfeiture would be permitted against the
property of an owner who was innocent. 301 Justice Kennedy stated
that applying civil forfeiture to such a case would be of questionable
constitutionality. 309
298. Id. at 2814.
299. Id. at 2814-15.






306. Like Justice Scalia's opinion, this concurrence stated that it was misleading
and probably not an accurate summation of history to find that forfeitures were
ever based on the owner's blameworthy conduct. Id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
307. Id. at 2816. Justice Kennedy's concurrence stated, "At some point, we may
have to confront the constitutional question whether forfeiture is permitted when
the owner has committed no wrong of any sort, intentional or negligent. That for





V. SIG MFCANCE OF Austin v. United States
Austin v. United States appears to be a landmark decision
because for the first time courts must apply constitutional protections
provided by the Eighth Amendment to civil forfeitures. 1 0 An ex-
cessive forfeiture will not be allowed to stand, since it will be in
violation of the Excessive Fines Clause."' Importantly, the Austin
decision is one of several recent decisions 12 which indicate the United
States Supreme Court's increasing willingness to apply constitutional
protections to protect property owners in civil forfeitures despite the
in rem nature of the proceeding. t However, the significance of the
Austin decision may be limited by two important factors. First, its
holding may be limited to facilitation forfeiture; second, its practical
application may be limited by how the courts define what will be
considered an excessive forfeiture.
First, the holding of Austin may be limited to situations where
the property subject to forfeiture was used to facilitate a crime.
Austin involved civil forfeiture of a mobile home and body shop
which were used to facilitate a drug sale. Since there were no proceeds
of crime which were forfeited under the facts presented in Austin,
the holding is arguably limited to facilitation forfeiture.31 4 It is yet
to be determined whether the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines
Clause is applicable to proceeds forfeiture cases as well."1 5
Second, the significance of the Austin decision may be limited
by how the courts define what will be excessive. Before Austin
reached the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
suggested in its opinion that the forfeiture of Austin's mobile home
and body shop might be excessive in relation to the crime he
committed.31 6 In the past, however, tht Supreme Court has upheld
310. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
311. Id.
312. See supra note 11.
313. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in
Little Rock, Ark. (Nov. 23, 1993).
314. "Facilitation forfeiture" refers to a forfeiture proceeding which is used to
obtain property that was used to facilitate a crime. Facilitation forfeiture may be
distinguished from "proceeds forfeiture" which targets the ill-gotten fruits of crime.
Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Apr. 12, 1994).
315. In one lower federal court decision, a California district court applied the
Excessive Fines Clause to a proceeds forfeiture case without discussing whether
such application is appropriate. See United States v. 6625 Zumierez Drive, No.
CV. 91-4531 MRP, 1994 WL 65684 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1994).
316. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
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large forfeitures for relatively small infractions.31 7 These decisions
may indicate that even though there is now a proportionality re-
quirement, even large differences in value may not violate the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause.
There are two basic tests which the lower courts might adopt
for determining whether a civil forfeiture is excessive. One is the
general test for determining whether a fine is excessive under the
Excessive Fines Clause which was announced in Solem v. Helm.318
The second possible test is that which was proposed by Justice Scalia
in his Austin concurrence. 19
The courts may decide to base a determination on the older
Solem v. Helm test applied to determine whether a fine is excessive
under the Excessive Fines Clause. 320 Under Solem, a court must
weigh the harshness of the penalty with the seriousness of the offense,
the penalty's severity in relation to that which other offenders in
the same jurisdiction receive for various offenses, and the penalty's
severity in relation to that which offenders in other jurisdictions
receive for the same crime.12'
The relationship between excessive forfeitures and mandatory
fines may prove applicable in a Solem analysis. Courts routinely
apply large fines in cases where civil forfeiture is not involved. For
example, if the defendant in Austin had been tried in federal criminal
court, he could have received a maximum fine of over one million
dollars under mandatory sentencing guidelines.3 22 This fine is pre-
sumably much greater than the value of the mobile home and auto
body shop, the forfeiture of which the Eighth Circuit suggested
represented too great a penalty for the crime committed. 323 It may
be problematic that the fine established by Congress is greater than
the forfeiture which might be unconstitutionally large. 324 This in-
consistency may have either of two possible effects. The discrepancy
between excessive forfeitures in relation to acceptable fines may
mean that despite the Eighth Circuit's suggestion that the fr,"-e.feit.urc
317. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (upholding a $130,000
forfeiture for a $585 offense); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663 (1973), reh'g denied, 477 U.S. 977 (1974) (upholding the forfeiture of a
$25,000 yacht for the possession of one marijuana cigarette).
318. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
319. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
320. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
321. Id. at 291.
322. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in





was excessive, the forfeiture was not, in fact, excessive when viewed
in light of other penalties Congress has established for the same
crime.3 25 On the other hand, this apparent inconsistency may indicate
that the fines for drug-related crimes established under the mandatory
sentencing guidelines may not withstand future challenges under the
Excessive Fines Clause.31 Congress may have to reevaluate the amount
of fines imposed as punishment for illegal drug acts if a Solem type
of analysis is applied to determine whether a given forfeiture is
excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
The second test which may be applied is that which was proposed
by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Austin .327 Justice
Scalia's analysis differs from the Solem analysis in that it would
focus the courts' attention on the closeness of the relationship be-
tween the offending property and the criminal act rather than on
the relationship between the value of the property and the severity
of the crime committed.12
It is likely that most lower courts will adopt some type of test
which reflects the Scalia analysis. Lower courts should also consider
the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. United States 29 when
deciding whether to apply the Scalia analysis to excessive forfeiture
problems. The Supreme Court decided Alexander on the same day
that it decided Austin.330 In Alexander, the Court held that the
Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to criminal forfeitures. 3 ' It is
noteworthy that the Alexander majority stated that on remand, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals should consider whether the for-
feiture in Alexander was excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause
in light of the criminal defendant's extensive criminal activities which
were conducted over a substantial period of time. This suggests an
analysis similar to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin.33 2 The
Supreme Court's instructions in Alexander indicate that the Supreme
Court would approve the adoption of an analysis in criminal for-
feiture cases similar to the one suggested by Justice Scalia regarding
the civil forfeiture in Austin. Although the holding in Alexander is
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812-15 (1993).
328. Id.
329. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
330. Both cases were decided on June 28, 1993.
331. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776.
332. Id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, Putting the Brakes on Forfeiture-High




applicable to in personam criminal forfeitures rather than in rem
civil forfeitures, it signals the Court's general approval of such an
analysis.
To date, at least three lower federal courts have been called
upon to apply the Austin holding in a civil forfeiture case.333 Two
courts essentially utilized Justice Scalia's proposed test in their anal-
ysis.334 Based on that reasoning, both courts held that under the
given facts, the challenged forfeiture did not violate the Excessive
Fines Clause. 35
The third lower federal court fashioned its own multifactor test
which incorporates the analyses set forth in Solem and Alexander
as well as the test suggested by Justice Scalia in Austin.336 That
court held that three factors should be considered when determining
333. See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Dr., No. CV. 91-4531 MRP, 1994 WL
65684 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1994); United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F.
Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1994); United States v. 84-049 Lawaia St., Civ. No. 90-
00767 DAE (D. Haw. Nov. 1, 1993).
334. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United States Attorney, in
Little Rock, Ark. (Apr. 12, 1994) (discussing an unpublished opinion which was
announced in November 1993 by the District Court of Hawaii). In United States
v. 84-049 Lawaia St., Civ. No. 90-00767 DAE (D. Haw. Nov. 1, 1993), the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii pointed out that Justice Scalia's
analysis is similar to the "substantial connection" test which has been applied by
some circuits, in decisions predating Austin, in an effort to determine whether a
given item of property was subject to forfeiture. Id. The First and Fourth Circuit
Courts have held that in order for real estate to be forfeitable under § .881(a)(7),
there must be a substantial connection between the property and the underlying
criminal activity. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 900 F.2d 470
(1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990). The
Seventh Circuit has rejected a test requiring a connection which is "more than
incidental or fortuitous," but has acknowledged that the difference between the
two tests is "blurry at best." United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490,
494 (7th Cir. 1990). A substantial connection has been found where there has been
repeated use of the property to facilitate a drug crime or where the property was
simply important to the facilitation of the crime. Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990-91.
Applying reasoning similar to the substantial connection test, the Hawaii court held
that since the evidence presented by the government showed a frequent, direct,
and substantial use of the property to facilitate illegal drug activity, the forfeiture
of the property was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The value of the
property was not considered. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant United
States Attorney, in Little Rock, Ark. (Apr. 12, 1994).
In another case, an Alabama court also applied Justice Scalia's proposed test
as the foundation for its proportionality analysis in a civil forfeiture case. See
United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1994). The
court found Justice Scalia's test to be "well reasoned" and held that the forfeiture
of a grocery store which was used as a selling place in two illegal drug transactions
did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 1430.
335. United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1994);
United States v. 84-049 Lawaia St., Civ. No. 90-00767 DAE (D. Haw. Nov. 1,
1993).
336. See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Dr., No. CV. 91-4531 MRP, 1994 WL
65684 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1994).
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whether a civil forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.33 7
First, the court weighed the inherent gravity of the offense against
the harshness of the penalty imposed.338 Second, the court considered
whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the
crime.3 9 Finally, the court determined whether the criminal activity
involving the property owner was extensive in terms of the time and
spatial use of the property. 314 Applying this multifactor test, this
court held that the civil forfeiture in question violated the Excessive
Fines Clause.
3 4'
Other lower courts will probably follow similar reasoning and
apply one of these tests or a combination of them in determining
whether a forfeiture is excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause.
If so, the value of the property will not be the most important
consideration in determining whether a forfeiture is excessive in
facilitation forfeiture cases. The relevant inquiry will be to what
extent the property aided in the commission of the crime.
Regardless of the test applied by the lower courts to determine
whether a forfeiture is excessive, the effect that the Austin decision
may have on the day to day workings of law enforcement agencies
involved in fighting drug-related crime should be considered. Cur-
rently, federal and state law enforcement agencies assert cooperative
efforts in investigating and prosecuting drug crimes. 42 State and
federal agencies share forfeited assets in proportion to the effort
each expended on a given case. 343 In many instances, the decision
as to whom will prosecute a given case is based, at least in part,
on the amount of forfeited property which will be distributed to
the prosecuting agency. 3" If Austin requires a limit on the amount
337. Id. at *4.
338. Id. The court derived this factor from the test announced in Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983). Zumirez, 1994 WL 65684, at *4; see also text accompanying
note 321. However, the court explicitly rejected the claimant's argument that a
Solem type test was sufficient to complete the analysis, stating that it is "impossible
to meaningfully compare" the value of property subject to a civil forfeiture which
is based on an illegal act with the criminal penalty for the act. Zumirez, 1994 WL
65684, at *2.
339. Zumirez, 1994 WL 65684, at *5. The court acknowledged that this factor
is modeled after the test that Justice Scalia proposed in Austin. Id.
340. Id. at *5-6. This factor reflects the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Alexander. Id.; see also text accompanying note 336.
341. Zumirez, 1994 WL 65684, at *4. Utilizing this test, the court found that
the forfeiture of a house which was used to store 152 grams of cocaine, 4.7 grams
of psilocybin, and one marijuana plant was an excessive forfeiture. Id. at *1, 14.
342. Interview with Michael Johnson, First Assistant' United States Attorney, in





of forfeited property which an agency may retain for itself, this
may affect the decision as to whether the state or federal agency
will prosecute the case. 4 5 These jurisdictional issues may be of tactical
importance to both prosecutors and criminal defendants. 6
Additionally, many law enforcement agencies depend on for-
feited property at least to some degree to help alleviate the financial
burden inherent in expensive criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions.34 7 This portion of the financial burden may be shifted from
criminals to taxpayers if forfeitures are sharply reduced. Finally, as
Congress recognized when it enacted Section 881, the effectiveness
of the antidrug laws can be greatly enhanced by consistent use of
civil forfeiture. A property value based application of the Austin
ruling may cause courts to develop case law which greatly limits
the ability of law enforcement agencies to remove the means and
profits of drug trade despite the congressional mandate to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Austin decision was the result of a long evolution of
forfeiture law. 348 Courts have incrementally supplied constitutional
protections to persons whose property is the subject of civil forfeiture
despite the historical fiction that the property owner is not a party
to the action. With the advent of Section 881, civil forfeiture has
become more widely used in recent years. In response to its increased
use, courts have been more willing than ever to step in and ensure
that the government's power which is associated with civil forfeitures
is not abused. With its required application of the Eighth Amendment
proportionality requirement to civil forfeitures, the Austin decision
appears to be the latest case in this succession. The modern trend
toward applying constitutional protections despite the in rem nature
of the action suggests that the Supreme Court's acceptance of the




347. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 152.
348. The history of forfeiture law is discussed in Part III.D of this note.
349. See supra note 9.
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